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INTRODUCTION 
The World Bank’s new education sector strategy (World Bank Education Strategy 
2020, hereafter referred to as WBES 2020) establishes the guidelines for new 
education priorities in low-income contexts for the coming decade. WBES 2020 
attempts to move the focus of education reforms further away from an inputs 
rationale to a reform agenda with outputs, governance, and managerial solutions at 
its core. More specifically, it advocates: (a) the adoption of a systemic approach to 
education reform that strengthens the role of non-government players and 
incentives in education, (b) a more discernible focus on learning outcomes, which 
implies measuring school results in order to generate a knowledge base with which 
to inform policy-makers and families, and (c) the dissemination of innovative 
approaches and demand-side interventions that can contribute to improving 
learning outcomes effectively. 
 WBES 2020 deserves our attention due to its enormous impact on the field of 
education for development. The World Bank’s Education Strategies, which are 
carefully distributed all around the world, have a great capacity for establishing 
education agendas globally. They are perceived, and to a great extent used, as a 
policy guide by many stakeholders operating in the field of education for 
development, including donors, NGOs, and ministries of education in less-
developed countries. The education sector strategies are probably the most 
outstanding policy document contributing to positioning the Bank as the 
intellectual leader of education reform in the field of development aid.  
 The explicit title of WBES 2020, Learning for All, is a clear recognition that 
something else must be done, beyond policies focusing on access, to ensure that 
schooling involves positive learning experiences. This could be perceived as a step 
forward in the World Bank commitment to education for development. However, 
as this paper argues, the Bank’s explicit and underlying policy options in WBES 
2020 reflect more continuities than breaks when compared to previous strategies, 
and moreover these policy options might not be adequate to achieve the “learning 
for all” goal.  
S.J. Klees et al. (eds.), The World Bank and Education, 125–142.
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 To develop this argument, this chapter is structured into two main sections. In 
the first section, we briefly review the development of the World Bank agenda in 
the educational field, as a way of putting the WBES 2020 and its content and 
priorities into historical perspective. As we shall see, this agenda has broadened 
and become more ambitious with the passage of time. The current strategy 
involves telling developing countries worldwide why they should introduce 
complex changes in the governance of their education systems to enhance the 
learning opportunities for all students. However, when it comes to the WBES 2020 
defining specific prescriptions, all things seem to remain quite equal in the World 
Bank’s education policy toolbox.  
 In the second section of this paper we identify and explore the main weaknesses 
of the policy ideas included in WBES 2020. We develop three sets of arguments in 
this respect. The first one refers to the Bank’s strong attachment to a disciplinary 
and methodological approach that is incapable of understanding what children 
learn and do not learn at school and why. The second group of arguments refers to 
the pro-market ideological bias of the Strategy with regard to public sector reform 
and new forms of educational provision. In third place the article points out the 
main shortfalls of the Strategy, with special reference to those omissions related to 
the complexity of the relationship between education and poverty.  
WBES 2020 IN PERSPECTIVE 
The World Bank does not have an official mandate on education due to the fact that 
UNESCO is formally the United Nation’s institution specializing in education. 
Nevertheless, paradoxically, the Bank has become one of the most influential 
international organizations in the field of education for development (Mundy, 
2002). In fact, after reading WBES 2020, which has the approval of the 
organization’s Executive Board of Directors, it might well be considered that the 
Bank has an implicit and broad mandate on education. This mandate could be 
summarized as the improvement of learning outcomes globally as a means of 
reducing poverty and integrating countries into the global economy. 
 The World Bank’s first projects, when it was established in 1945, focused on 
infrastructure development and had no connection whatsoever with education. In 
the nineteen sixties however, the Bank began to involve itself in education affairs, 
although often indirectly. The first education initiatives were subordinated to major 
infrastructure projects (e.g., they consisted of training programs designed to 
provide local workers with the skills they required in the construction and 
maintenance of new infrastructures) or consisted of education infrastructures 
themselves. Thus the first education projects that the Bank was involved in were 
very much restricted to the material aspects of education systems: the building of 
schools or the transfer of material assets for laboratories, workshops or libraries 
(Jones, 1997). Over the years the Bank moved from the hardware to the software 
of education systems, hired more staff specializing in education and adopted an 
agenda that was much more oriented towards “education policy” and not only to 
manpower demands (Human Development Network, 2002; Mundy, 2002).i  
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 The 1980 Education Policy Paper encourages the Bank staff, for the first time, 
to use rates of return in its analytic and projects lending work. As a consequence of 
the adoption of the rate of return analysis, the Bank’s education policy agenda was 
condensed into the so-called “short menu” of education policy (Heyneman, 2003). 
This menu, which clearly crystallized in 1986 into the Bank’s policy note 
“Financing Education in Developing Countries,” advocated: (a) concentrating 
public investment in primary education, encouraging the privatization of higher 
education levels, (b) increasing the private cost for attending secondary and higher 
education, and (c) installing cost-recovery measures (loan schemes and taxes on 
graduates) in higher education (Jones, 1997).  
 The “short menu” prevailed for years in the Bank’s discourse and practice 
regarding education, and was reinforced in the 1995 World Bank policy review 
Priorities and Strategies for Education. This document was given the status of a 
“policy review,” although in reality it is highly prescriptive in nature.ii In addition 
to funding options similar to those included in the short menu, the review pledged 
its commitment to policies such as the decentralization of education systems, 
school autonomy, and the measurement of education outcomes. It also expressed 
an interest in the area of curriculum planning, highlighting the importance of 
subjects such as mathematics and language for economic development, and 
recommended establishing clear performance indicators to monitor the extent to 
which learning standards were being attained (Lauglo, 1996; World Bank, 1995). 
The 1995 Policy Review represented an expansion of the short education menu, 
which was very much focused on education financing, and a move towards a more 
comprehensive approach to education reform, including recommendations 
concerning curricula and the regulation and provision of education. 
 The first official education sector strategy was published in 1999.iii This strategy 
set out the following priorities: promoting quality education for all in order to 
address the huge gaps in learning among and within countries (with a focus on 
girls and on the poorest), early child development (ECD), innovative delivery (i.e., 
education services provided via ICTs) and systemic reform. The systemic reform 
focused on three areas that had already been formulated in a very similar way in 
the 1995 Policy Review: (a) standards, curriculum and achievement assessment, 
(b) governance and decentralization, and (c) encouraging investment in education 
by the private sector (World Bank, 1999). 
 The 1999 Strategy was updated in 2005. The most significant innovation 
included in this update is an apparent loss of centrality of the rates of return 
analysis due to a renewed emphasis on public investment in higher education. This 
shift was justified by the strategic contribution of universities to the building of 
“knowledge economies” (World Bank, 2005). The “knowledge economy” idea 
became a very powerful economic imaginary in the last decade, and most countries 
on the planet, those from both the developed and the developing world, expressed 
and still express their ambition to become such a type of economy (Robertson, 
2005). However, it should be also considered that, since the World Education 
Conference held in Dakar in 2000, the donor community, and in particular the 
Education for All Fast Track Initiative, headquartered in the World Bank, has 
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concentrated more efforts on the funding of basic education. Consequently, 
financial resources have been freed for the Bank to lend in other levels of 
education. 
 In 2011, after a long and unprecedented consultation process that included 
dozens of meetings in 53 different countries, WBES 2020 was published. Despite 
the input received from hundreds of stakeholders during these consultations, the 
new Education Sector Strategy reflects more than anything continuity within the 
World Bank’s education policy agenda. The focus on systemic reform, learning 
outcomes, evaluation and measurement (both at the national and cross-national 
levels), the key role of the private sector, the positive effects of ECD, and the 
importance of education as a key tool for tackling poverty and reinforcing 
employment markets is formulated in a similar way in all the Strategies (including 
the 1995 Policy Review). The last two Strategies emphasize the importance of 
generating a knowledge base for education systems, and put forward initiatives 
aimed at achieving this (EKMS in the 1999 Strategy, and SABER in the 2020 
Strategy).iv The first education strategy documents use human capital theory to 
justify investment in education (and the involvement of the World Bank in 
education), whereas the most recent strategy uses a revised version of this theory 
devised by the Bank’s current education champion, Eric Hanushek, who replaces 
“years of schooling” with “learning achievement” as the independent variable for 
economic growth. Lastly, the Bank’s desire to collaborate in bilateral and 
multilateral aid delivery partnerships with other aid agencies has been expressed 
since the 1995 policy review, although it is more broadly developed in the 
subsequent Sector Strategies. 
 Naturally, some differences can also be identified. In terms of systemic reform, 
the current Strategy displays less interest in decentralization and curriculum 
policies than that expressed in the 1995 and 1999 documents, and gives more 
importance to governance changes based on accountability and incentives 
schemes, and also to the role of the private sector. Despite reservations, the 1999 
Strategy acknowledged the importance of teachers’ organizations in formulating 
and implementing reforms, yet in WBES 2020 there is not a single reference to 
them. The current Strategy lacks the technological optimism of the 1999 document, 
and attributes a much more secondary role to ICT education. Lastly, it is significant 
that, for the first time, WBES 2020 acknowledges that there is no trade-off between 
equity and quality, and that more equitable systems in fact achieve better results. 
 The continuity in the themes, priorities and policy options of the Bank’s 
education strategies over time, and also the different levels of emphasis given to 
certain topics at different moments, can be clearly seen in the following charts (see 
Figure 1).v 




Figure 9. Keywords Clouds in Past and Current Education Strategies  
(1995, 1999 and 2020) 
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EXAMINING THE BANK’S “LEARNING FOR ALL” STRATEGY 
The explicit title of the new strategy, Learning for All, carries an implicit 
recognition of the limits of past education strategies, which have failed to 
transform educational investment into sufficient learning, especially for the poor 
(Bonal, 2007; Jones, 2006). Far from introducing self-criticism, the WBES 2020 
interprets the history of the Bank’s strategic policies as an accumulative process of 
learning “what works best” in education. In this section, we point out the main 
problems and shortcomings that prevail in the causal ideas and methodological 
strategies that support the World Bank’s current education agenda. Specifically, we 
problematize three main aspects: the predominant economic approach to education 
analysis and reform; the emphasis placed on education markets and the role of the 
private sector; and the shortfalls in the complex relationship between poverty and 
education. 
Captured by the Method: Learning within the System Approach 
The World Bank’s main policy recommendations in the field of education included 
in this and in previous Strategies are shaped by an economic rationale and spring 
from an economics-based view of education problems. In fact, as the World Bank 
itself admits, one of the implicit objectives of the Education Strategies is to inform 
outsiders about things that insiders take for granted, such as “the value of an 
economics-based approach to education development” (HDN, 2002, p. 430). 
However, this disciplinary bias also has its limitations, and contributes to 
constraints by the analytical methods it uses for studying educational systems and 
policies. The goal of developing a universal and irrefutable scientific knowledge 
base and methodology for evaluating educational reforms, together with a strong 
belief in market solutions for such development, leads the Bank into dismissing 
other more context-sensitive approaches for assessing educational policies. The 
inclusion of such approaches would make the Bank more cautious about any 
pretension of universality. 
 One of the main features of WBES 2020 is its desire to overcome input-driven 
reforms and place learning outcomes as the central goal. Learning for all, and not 
simply access for all, is set up as the main priority. As stated in the Strategy: 
“improving systems also requires ensuring that inputs are used more effectively to 
accelerate learning. While past strategies have recognized this goal, the new 
strategy gives it more emphasis, setting it in a context of education system 
assessment and reform” (p. ix).  
 However, what does moving beyond input-driven policies mean for the Bank? 
The Bank interprets this as changing the governance and management of schools 
and teachers and aligning financing rules and incentive mechanisms with the goal 
of learning for all (p. x). Beyond a widespread support for the introduction of 
market rules and demand-side interventions into education systems, it is not 
possible to distinguish in the Strategy which specific forms of governance and 
management are the ones that would ensure learning, as it is not possible to 
identify which specific causal relations explain learning better. The Bank is 
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extremely vague about how to introduce reforms in these areas: “The mechanisms 
that connect the various parts of the system need to be reformed so that functions, 
authority, and relationships of accountability within the system are clear and 
aligned with national educational goals” (p. 18). 
 Here lies one of the main contradictions of the Strategy. The Bank defends 
evidence-based policies, but is unable to provide convincing evidence about what 
really works to ensure that children do learn at school. Actually, the Bank defines 
the Strategy in terms of two main approaches: strengthening education systems and 
building a high-quality knowledge base. Interestingly enough, the nature of these 
two approaches is significantly different. Both of them carry a substantial level of 
generality, but while the first approach can be translated into specific measures that 
would potentially improve learning, the second approach can only be understood 
as providing the necessary means for knowledge and not as a strategic action that 
would improve learning. In other words, it is possible to establish a relationship 
between better education systems and better learning, but not between knowing 
more about the education system and better learning (and thus it is of course 
possible to have an extensive knowledge about an education system and have a 
high rate of low performers). Acquiring knowledge about the education system is 
of course necessary, but one would expect a strategic paper to reveal which 
knowledge and for what specific purposes.  
 The nature of the knowledge about education systems that the Bank expects to 
obtain reflects a systemic view of education systems, which can be defined as the 
chain between input-processes-outcomes of different integrated education factors. 
For the Bank, better knowledge about education systems means obtaining more 
information about each of these phases. Applying a systemic approach to policy 
making is a difficult task, since policy-makers cannot control all the factors that 
may potentially improve education systems. Thus, “the key to implementing the 
system approach is to recognize that it does not imply acting on all parts of the 
system at once, but being aware of them and analyzing how they affect each other” 
(p. 42). This fact, for the Bank, can be translated into the principle “analyze 
globally, act locally” (p. 6). 
 The priorities established by the WBES 2020 are a good example of how the 
Bank aims to lever its capacity to lead the global analyses of education systems. 
Among other applications, this makes it possible to run cross-country regression 
analyses with numerous observations, which can respond to the expressed aim of 
generalizing results. “All things being equal,” the Bank should then be able to 
deduce what works better universally to improve learning. The Bank’s implicit 
message to national governments seems to be: “improve your data collection 
capacity so that we can run more reliable cross-country analysis and regressions.” 
 Due to the territorial scope of the World Bank, its methods of study and policy 
recommendations must necessarily be applicable to different social contexts and 
different education systems. However, at the same time, the World Bank is 
increasingly defending the importance of context-based policies and strategies. 
Despite this intention, the Bank is constrained by a method that intrinsically 
ignores the context. While learning processes are by their very nature contextually 
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based on the living conditions and cultural experiences of individuals, the World 
Bank confines the Strategy within the limits of education systems. The Strategy 
“redefines” the term education system as a network of relationships, including all 
potential players intervening in the learning opportunities offered by a society, i.e., 
within and outside of formal education institutions (p. 16). However, the methods 
for providing evidence are restricted to techniques (such as regression analysis or 
production functions)vi that reveal the inability of the Bank to grasp those factors 
that are not easily measurable or observable. According to Weaver (2007): 
“[Within the Bank] considerable weight is given to economic and technical factors 
that are easy to identify and measure, whereas complex political and social risk 
assessments that involve soft qualitative indicators are usually neglected or 
distrusted as ‘unscientific’” (p. 507). 
 The system approach defended by the World Bank is in fact a sign of the power 
of the method. The best example of this can be found in Point 20 of the executive 
summary, where the Strategy states that “careful system analysis will allow for 
clearer differentiation of countries by level of educational system, rather than by 
overall development alone” (p. xi). This is actually a declaration of principles: the 
performance of education systems, rather than their development, is the main goal. 
Why the good performance of education systems is not translated into more 
development, or why good educational performance is unable to reduce poverty 
and inequality, are questions that are omitted in WBES 2020. 
 A final observation about the power of the method has to do with the possible 
reasons that motivate the inclusion of learning as a priority goal of the strategy. 
There is of course evidence showing the limits to the extent that educational 
expansion can be converted into learning. Other strategic declarations, such as the 
recent Metas Educativas 2021 (Educational Goals) for Latin America, stress the 
fact that Latin American countries have been able to expand primary and 
secondary education over the past decade, but unable to achieve high educational 
performance. However, over the past decade we have witnessed the widespread 
application of performance evaluation systems and especially the consolidation of 
PISA as the main reference of skill acquisition in educational systems. PISA is, as 
WBES 2020 acknowledges, a powerful instrument for assessing educational 
performance, but it is in no way a context-based instrument for discovering how 
and why children learn in different educational systems. The main asset of PISA is 
that it is a measurable instrument that facilitates comparisons. The temptation to 
reduce learning measurement to performance in international standardized tests 
(such as PISA, TIMSS or PIRLS) is too strong to be avoided. Nonetheless, useful 
learning for social and labor inclusion goes far beyond merely performing well in 
standardized tests.  
 Reducing the analysis of learning factors to variables that are measurable and 
quantifiable, as well as internationally comparable, is actually a clear sign of the 
power of the method. In WBES 2020, the World Bank proclaims itself as the global 
leader and promoter of a paradigm of educational research that incorporates a 
pretension of universality and irrefutability that cannot easily cope with the goal of 
contextually based learning. 
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Overrating Market Solutions 
The World Bank has been backing private sector participation in education for 
decades. However, in this regard the 2020 Strategy goes a step further than 
previous policy papers. The current Strategy puts stronger emphasis on the 
importance of the private sector for meeting the EFA goals, it is openly supportive 
of “for-profit” private education providersvii, it raises the educational lending 
profile of the International Finance Corporation (IFC)—the World Bank Group 
agency that deals directly with the private sector, and it considers that the private 
sector can be of direct benefit to the poor.viii In relation to the latter, it should be 
acknowledged that the 1999 Strategy rather established an indirect relationship 
between private schooling and poverty, the rationale being that those families that 
can afford it should attend private schools, because by doing so they release 
government resources that can be invested in improving the public schools 
attended by the poor. By contrast, WBES 2020 states that: “Although it is often 
assumed that the private sector serves mainly students who can afford to pay, 
private entities are important providers of education services to even the poorest 
communities, especially in areas that governments do not reach” (p. 20). 
 Implicit in WBES 2020 is the fact that private institutions are inherently better 
than state schools, and that poor students will benefit from attending private 
schools—by means of a voucher system, for example (p. 6). However, the Strategy 
provides no evidence of the supposed better performance of private schools, 
though it should be acknowledged that evidence on the topic is very mixed. In fact, 
it is not possible to reach universal conclusions on this topic because research 
results are highly contingent on the different types of private schools, the socio-
economic composition of schools and the education regulations prevailing in 
different countries (Calero & Escardíbul, 2007; Vandenberghe & Robin, 2004). 
Interestingly enough, recent analyses of PISA data tell us that, “all else being 
equal” (especially when controlling for the socio-economic status of students), the 
type of ownership of the school, whether it is a private or a state school, has only 
modest effects on students achievements or none at all (Fertig, 2003; OECD, 2005; 
Corten & Dronkers, 2006). 
 WBES 2020 strongly advocates that governments establish partnerships with the 
private sector and regulate this sector in a way that encourages the emergence of 
private providers and controls the quality of the services they provide. In line with 
the categories suggested by Ball and Youdell (2007), we might consider that the 
World Bank supports two types of privatization: on the one hand, the privatization 
of education, and on the other, privatization in education. The privatization of 
education consists of encouraging the increase of private provision and the number 
of private schools within education systems. The Strategy suggests that this can be 
done by means of contract schools or subsidies to the private sector. The main 
objective of the privatization of education is to expand the schooling resources 
available in a particular territory.  
 For its part, privatization in education consists of encouraging state schools to 
behave and be run like private providers, with the aim of making them more 
competitive and raising their quality standards. According to WBES 2020, these 
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objectives can be achieved by introducing incentives schemes and competitive 
funding formulas (vouchers, results-oriented financing, etc.). Influenced by 
economic theory and by a rationalistic conception of humans as benefit-
maximizers, competition and school choice are two core policy principles in the 
2020 Strategy. Both principles are expected to be important elements in the “results 
chain that lies between inputs and learning outcomes” (p. x) that the 2020 Strategy 
attempts to identify: “Power of greater autonomy at the provider level and of 
competition for resources (such as through the use of performance incentives or 
vouchers) [will contribute] to generate a strong motivation among providers for 
better service delivery” (p. 15). At the same time, the Strategy assumes that choice 
and competition will contribute to low-quality schools losing enrollment and 
consequently disappearing from the market. 
 Applying market metaphors such as choice or competition to education systems 
sounds persuasive. However, such metaphors are very difficult to translate 
successfully into practical policies. Optimum school choice requires conditions, 
such as perfect information or sufficient offer, which are hardly ever met in low-
income contexts. Even when the right to choose is guaranteed by the state, most 
families, especially those affected by poverty, fail to exercise this right as the Bank 
would expect (i.e., by choosing the better school). Rather than choosing based on 
school quality, families usually choose a school accordingly to criteria such as 
proximity, cost, social relations, pre-conceptions of the different types of schools, 
religious preferences or discipline in class (Nieuwenhuys, 1993; Härmä, 2009; 
Fennel, 2012). Moreover, in poor, rural, or under-populated areas families may not 
have enough providers to be able to choose.  
 Regardless of whether they are desirable or not, markets in education may not 
be feasible in many countries where the World Bank intervenes, because they are 
very costly and technically demanding. In order to work properly, markets in 
education require a very complex and often expensive set of support services and 
procedures (transportation, quality assurance, information systems, dispute 
settlement systems, bidding processes, etc.) the implementation of which might be 
too challenging in low-income countries (Verger, 2011). Not surprisingly, the 2011 
Independent Evaluation Group report finds quite uneven results in the World Bank 
portfolio of education projects due to “design and implementation weaknesses” 
including “overly complex designs relative to local capacities” (IEG, 2011, p. 13). 
Furthermore, if the for-profit sector is to be included in the provision of public 
education, as WBES 2020 suggests, the economic incentives that the state would 
have to provide them to deliver their services in poor areas could make the 
proposal even more expensive (Rosenau, 2000). 
 In many low-income countries, the amount of private education on offer is very 
low. Thus, instead of expecting state regulation to encourage the flourishing of 
private education entrepreneurs, states would reach the EFA targets in a quicker 
and more sustainable way by enlarging and strengthening the public sector. At 
least, this is the conclusion of Lewin (2007) in a cross-country research on this 
topic in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Lewin warns, markets-in-education policies are 
too often inspired by experiences and models drawn from well-developed, 
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professionalized, regulated, and (already) partly marketized education systems. 
These policies are not easily transferable to partly developed, poorly 
professionalized, largely unregulated systems such as those existing in the 
countries where the World Bank operates. 
 Moving Lewin’s argument on a little further, it should be acknowledged that 
even in rich countries, the evidence for the positive effects of markets in education 
is still not conclusive. After reviewing hundreds of pieces of research on school 
choice and competition between schools, a recent OECD Education Paper 
concludes that, “if any effects are found at all, they are small” (Waslander et al., 
2010, p. 64). However, the World Bank misrepresents an important part of the 
literature on the topic and, very selectively, overestimates the results of its own 
impact evaluations and the research of like-minded scholars. Its policy 
recommendations contradict research that points out to the neutral or even negative 
effects of education markets in dimensions such as achievement (see Rouse & 
Barrow, 2009; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000), efficiency (Levin, 1999), and especially 
equity (Reay, 2004; Fiske & Ladd, 2000; Alegre & Ferrer, 2010). 
 WBES 2020 is very optimistic about the potential role of the IFC in benefiting 
the poor through private education. Among other factors, the Strategy supports the 
IFC due to its capacity for providing financing for “larger network providers who 
have the ability to invest across borders and go down-market to reach poorer 
populations” and “small and medium enterprises which typically target poor 
populations” (p. 32). However, as recent research shows, the IFC is not reaching 
the poorest countries and the poorest populations. Between 2006 and 2010, only 
4.8 percent of IFC education investments were made in low-income countries, and 
67 percent of the current projects are at the tertiary education level (Mundy & 
Menashy 2012). Furthermore, as the same study shows, equity investments in 
education are considered risky within the IFC. In 2010, an internal rate of return of 
-32 percent was reported in educational projects. 
 To conclude, it is a very positive fact that the Bank, via WBES 2020, is moving 
away from a too simplistic focus on inputs when it comes to education reform. 
However, the current focus on managerial solutions, private education, and 
education markets should not detract from the fact that most education systems in 
low-income contexts still have strong dependence on increasing levels of public 
investment in schools building, books, teacher training and salaries (Glewwe, 
2002).ix  
Closing the Learning Gap: A Goal without Means 
One of the salient features of WBES 2020 is the importance given to the 
relationship between equity and learning. This is certainly a new strategic direction 
that is absent in previous strategies. The 1995 Policy Review was clearly 
dependent on an economic policy that almost despised social and educational 
inequalities as factors preventing development. There, the goal of economic 
growth was the main, and almost exclusive, priority for the World Bank. 
ANTONI VERGER AND XAVIER BONAL 
136 
 In contrast, the current Strategy aligns the objective of Learning for All with the 
equity goals that underlie the education MDGs. This assertion is repeated in 
several sections of the Strategy, and it is based on the evidence provided by the 
PISA results. Thus, the Bank highlights that “the latest (2009) PISA results 
reinforce the lesson that the countries that are most successful overall in promoting 
learning are those with the narrowest gaps in learning achievement among 
students” (p. viii). When reading this, one would expect that recognizing the 
centrality of equity would be translated into a set of policy recommendations to 
address the inequalities in education systems effectively. However, the “equity 
matters” discourse does not lead to any redistributive orientation of education 
policies. The Bank’s emphasis on evidence-based policy is absolutely partial here. 
While the Strategy recognizes the importance of equity, it ignores those forms of 
evidence that explain why education systems remain unequal. Evidence related to 
education system regulations, school segregation, differences in school quality or 
the “peer effect” on learning is completely ignored.x  
 Interestingly enough, the Strategy draws a narrow equivalence between equity 
and targeting population groups that experience specific barriers to learning. It 
states: “A well-functioning education system will therefore have policies or 
programs that specifically address the disadvantages faced by some population 
groups … and will target special resources to assist those disadvantaged groups” 
(p. 21). The reduction of equity to targeting resources means also avoiding possible 
universal policy strategies that could potentially reduce educational privileges and 
redistribute educational opportunities among the most disadvantaged groups.  
 Within the notion of targeting, the Bank includes “demand-side interventions, 
such as the abolition of school fees and targeted scholarships, cash transfers that 
compensate families for the opportunity cost of children’s school attendance, and 
vouchers that enable poor students to attend private educational institutions” (p. 6). 
This quote shows that the Bank includes demand-side interventions of a very 
different nature within the same set of policy instruments. However, abolishing 
school fees, arranging conditional cash transfers (CCTs), or giving vouchers to 
poor students to attend private institutions are policies that respond to very 
different conceptions of educational equity. Moreover, the evidence regarding the 
effects of some of the proposed policies is not at all conclusive, and as a 
consequence it is questionable whether they can be taken as best practices for 
achieving learning for all. 
 CCT evaluations, for instance, offer a picture of different effects at different 
levels, depending very much on program design (Bonal et al., 2012). Impacts on 
school access are normally positive (because of conditionality) but are less definite 
in learning processes and educational performance (Reimers et al., 2006). The 
educational quality of the schools attended by the program’s beneficiaries and the 
living conditions of poor children are decisive factors preventing the expected 
effects of the transfer on learning (Tarabini, 2008; Bonal & Tarabini, 2010).  
 For its part, the impact of voucher programs on educational equity also presents 
mixed evidence, but the scale tips in favor of studies that show that vouchers 
increase segmentation of the education system according to the socioeconomic 
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status of students (UNESCO, 2009; Waslander, 2010). In this sense, it is 
paradoxical that the Bank on the one hand defends the importance of equity for 
learning achievement, while on the other it advocates for voucher schemes and 
other market policies in education that most evidence shows as increasing 
education inequalities and school segregation. In any case, as occurs with CCTs, 
considering vouchers as a policy instrument that “works” or “does not work” is 
misleading, since their effects depend to a great extent on how these programs are 
designed and how the beneficiaries are selected (Levin, 2002). Instead of 
formulating over-simplistic bi-variable relations between policy interventions and 
outcomes, the Bank would benefit from formulating their impact evaluation 
questions in a more nuanced manner (i.e., what works for whom in what 
circumstances and how) (Pawson & Tilley, 1997), as well as from embracing 
qualitative methodological approaches to capture the importance of local 
regulations, preferences and social norms when it comes to understanding and 
evaluating the schooling experience of children (Fennell & Arnot, 2008; Klees, 
2008). 
 WBES 2020 is also clear about the need for targeting policies to be inclusive 
enough to reach the poorest. The policy paper recognizes the need to look beyond 
the educational experience of children for the factors that prevent learning. 
Learning is not only about schooling. Investments in the nutritional and 
health status of very young children and the quality of their interaction with 
parents and caregivers determine the readiness of children to learn. Likewise, 
programs that address hunger, malnutrition, and disease among 
schoolchildren significantly improve their academic performance …. Indeed, 
learning is not simply the business of education agencies; it should also 
involve social welfare and/or social protection and health agencies in the 
design and implementation of policies across sectors that ensure young 
children have the foundational skills to succeed in school. (pp. 12-13) 
The above statement acknowledges the importance of the effects of poverty on 
education. Actually, this relationship is powerful enough to reduce the potential 
positive effects of education to a fight against poverty (Bonal, 2007; Jones, 2006). 
However, the educational policy paradigm that has sustained the World Bank 
education policy over recent decades has in fact explicitly disregarded the effects 
of poverty on education. The reason for this is that human capital theory 
incorporates a view of education as a cause of development, and never as an effect 
of social and economic policies. For the Bank, conceptions of educational 
development have always been equivalent to educational investments, as a form of 
capital investment. This understanding of the role of education for development 
has not left room for other approaches that could question the universality of the 
principles of human capital theory. Consequently, if the Bank took the above 
assertion seriously, it would mean a real paradigm change in its educational policy 
strategy. It would mean also putting development before education, and 
understanding that education development is not only a cause of development, but 
also a consequence of development processes in multiple areas (economy, health, 
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etc.). And that would mean connecting education to policies and outcomes in other 
areas of development with determination.  
 Educational development needs the adoption of a multi-sectorial approach that 
acknowledges that there are non-educational factors preventing learning. WBES 
2020 performs an interesting exercise by including all possible links between the 
education strategy and other Bank sector strategies (see Annex 3 of the Strategy). 
For each strategy the Bank tries to identify the education contributions to the sector 
in question and, vice versa, how other sectors contribute to education. But linking 
all sectors with education is not exactly developing a multi-sectorial approach. A 
real multi-sectorial approach should actually be included in the core of the policy 
paper and not in the appendix, and should be necessarily integrative. It should 
address aspects related to conditions governing the educability of children (López 
& Tedesco, 2002), i.e., identifying the minimum social requirements needed for a 
child to learn at school. If closing the learning gap requires poor children to learn, 
as the Bank states in several parts of the policy paper, the Strategy should 
concentrate on those social, psychological, material, or cultural factors that prevent 
poor children from taking advantage of their school experience. WBES 2020 
emphasizes mainly nutritional and health aspects as non-educational variables 
related to learning. But this is a reductionist interpretation of the multiple 
dimensions of poverty impacting on the learning conditions of children. Looking at 
the conditions of educability involves both a multifaceted understanding of poverty 
and the use of qualitative methods able to grasp the living experiences of children 
in diverse social spaces. It will be difficult to capture these elements using the 
quantitative cross-national studies or positivistic impact evaluations usually 
undertaken by the Bank. 
CONCLUSIONS 
WBES 2020 does not introduce significant policy innovations compared to the 
previous World Bank education strategies. In this document, the focus on systemic 
reform, learning outcomes, evaluation, and measurement, the key role of the 
private sector, and the importance of education as a key tool for tackling poverty 
and for reinforcing employment markets is formulated in a way very similar to 
previous Strategies. 
 Continuity would not be a problem if there were not serious limitations in some 
of the key analytical ideas behind the Strategy and in the policies it prescribes. The 
expression “all things being equal” in the title of this chapter refers not only to 
whether or not the World Bank is presenting substantial changes in WBES 2020. 
“All things being equal” is also a common expression used by the Bank 
economists to illustrate empirical evidence in education. As we have argued in this 
paper, the system approach defended by the Bank reflects its attachment to a 
disciplinary knowledge and to empirical methods that attempt to explain how 
variables behave in hypothetical contexts of “other things remaining equal.” Yet, 
since learning is a highly contextually-based phenomenon, this form of empirical 
“ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL”? 
139 
evidence is not the most appropriate way of explaining policies about how children 
learn at school and why. 
 Once again, the latest Education Sector Strategy reveals a strong faith in the 
superior efficiency and quality of market solutions and private schooling, which 
are causal beliefs that are not supported sufficiently by evidence. In fact, evidence 
rather shows that market solutions affect education equity purposes negatively. The 
latter observation precisely undermines the most significant conceptual innovation 
in WBES 2020, which is that of acknowledging education equity as a means of 
education quality and learning. We have also shown that WBES 2020 fails to 
capture the complexity of the education and poverty relationship accurately, since 
it does not contemplate the multiple dimensions of poverty influencing the learning 
conditions of children. 
 In WBES 2020, the World Bank accurately considers that an inputs approach to 
education reform is too simplistic and insufficient, and that policy-makers need to 
pay more attention to the governance of education systems. However, this message 
should not be misunderstood as disregarding inputs, since education systems  
in most developing contexts are in need of increasing resources, sometimes 
urgently so. Furthermore, the emphasis on demand-side and managerial 
interventions could obscure variables (such as the peer effect, the educability 
conditions of children, or local education rules and norms) that are key to an 
understanding of student learning, and that are unfortunately absent in the 2020 
Strategy “Learning for all.” 
NOTES 
i  The adjustment in lending generated the conditions for this to happen. SAPs meant that countries 
would have fewer resources available from public budgets for social services such as education. 
Consequently, they had to borrow from the Bank to cover their often-expanding education needs 
(Mundy, 2002). 
ii  In fact, the World Bank itself considers it to be de facto a primary sector strategy. See “Previous 
Education Strategies” in: http://go.worldbank.org/208ECTQCC0  
iii  The Sector Strategies were promoted with Wolfensonh’s deep organizational reform of the World 
Bank (1996-2000). Before this reform, the Bank was organized accordingly to territorial criteria. As 
a consequence, the Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) were the organization’s main strategic 
documents. Wolfensonh’s reform introduced a thematic focus in the organization (via the 
strengthening of thematic research and thematic networks), and consequently the Thematic or Sector 
Strategies became an important political product within the Bank, at a CAS level (HDN, 2002; 
Nielson et al., 2006). 
iv  EKMS stands for Education Knowledge Management System and SABER for System Assessment 
and Benchmarking for Education Results. 
v  Word clouds have been created using the on-line application “Wordle.” To strengthen the 
comparative power of the charts, we have not included words like World Bank, schools, countries or 
education. 
vi  See examples of how these techniques can be problematic to guide policy when used uncritically, in 
Glewwe (2002) or Klees (2008). 
vii  Interestingly, the 1995 Policy Review states that, in order to license a private school in Nigeria, “the 
proprietor must meet many ostensibly reasonable requirements (for example, showing that the 
school will be non-profit)” (World Bank, 1995, p. 123). 
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viii  Interestingly, Figure 1 also shows how, with the passage of time, the “private” concept has gained 
terrain (to the detriment of the “public” one) in the World Bank policy discourse. 
ix  This affirmation is also valid for richer countries such as Argentina (see Santos 2007). 
x  See for instance Dupriez et al. (2008) and Hanushek et al. (2003) for evidence of the importance of 
some of these factors in explaining differences in student performance. 
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